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Laker Airways: Recognizing the Need for




The United States and the United Kingdom have long been in
conflict over the extraterritorial application of United States anti-
trust laws. The British resent the often lucrative remedies that
United States competition laws provide because they disagree with
the philosophy behind those laws. Moreover, the British find particu-
larly irritating the use of American discovery procedures within the
United Kingdom since those procedures permit discovery well be-
yond the scope of discovery allowed under British law. Finally, the
exercise by United States courts of long arm extraterritorial jurisdic-
tion in the area of antitrust litigation is considered by the British to
be an invasion of their sovereign rights. To thwart the United States
in its imposition of American antitrust policy abroad, the British
Parliament passed a blocking statute1 in 1980 known as The Protec-
tion of Trading Interests Act.2
This article analyzes the conflict between the United States and
the United Kingdom regarding the extraterritorial application of
American antitrust laws. It begins by presenting a history of the dis-
pute and then describes how that dispute culminated in a judicial
* Member California Bar. B.A. 1982, UCLA; J.D. 1985, University of San Diego
School of Law; University of San Diego Institute of International and Comparative Law,
1984, Magdalen College, Oxford and Trinity College, Dublin. The author currently serves on
the Board of Directors of Media Workshops Foundation.
The author wishes to acknowledge the support of his family who has encouraged him in
writing this article and who has also supported him in any endeavor which he has chosen to
undertake.
I. "A 'blocking statute' restricts 'the extent to which United States litigants can ob-
tain evidence or production of commercial documents abroad for use in investigations or pro-
ceedings in the United States, and, secondly, the enforcement of United States judgments.'"
Comment, The Shipping Act of 1984: Bringing the United States in Harmony with Interna-
tional Shipping Practices, 3 DICK. J. INT'L L. 198 n. 8 (1985) [hereinafter cited as Shipping
Act of 1984] (quoting Pettit and Styles, The International Response to the Extraterritorial
Application of United States Antitrust Laws, 37 Bus. LAw. 697, 699 (1982)).
2. The Protection of Trading Interests Act, 1980 c.l I, reprinted in 21 INT'L LEGAL
MAT. 834 (1982) [hereinafter cited as PTIA]. See also infra notes 67-92 and accompanying
text.
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battle in the recent Laker Airways litigation.3
The article recognizes, however, that the question of extraterri-
torial application of United States antitrust laws is too political in
nature to be determined in the judicial arena. Indeed, recent at-
tempts by United States courts to balance United States and foreign
interests' have done nothing to assuage Britain's aversion toward
American antitrust laws. This article therefore discusses the need for
a bilateral antitrust treaty between the United States and Great
Britain and recommends specific provisions to be included in that
treaty.
II. Extraterritorial Application of United States Antitrust Laws
The United States has not always asserted extraterritorial juris-
diction in the area of antitrust law. Seventy-five years ago, in the
seminal case American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co.,5 Justice
Holmes remarked that it was "surprising to hear argued" that acts
outside the territory of the United States are governed by the Sher-
man Act.6 The law had changed by 1945, however, when in United
States v. Aluminum Co. of America (Alcoa)7 Judge Learned Hand
asserted extraterritoriality and declared that it was "settled law...
that any state may impose liabilities, even upon persons not within
its allegiance, for conduct outside its borders that has consequences
within its borders which the state reprehends."8 Judge Hand's deci-
sion in Alcoa has since stood as the impetus for extraterritorial ap-
plication of American antitrust laws. 9
However, Judge Hand did not allow the exercise of extraterrito-
rial jurisdiction to remain unrestricted. For any defendant outside
the United States to be held liable under the Alcoa decision his con-
duct must have both been intended to affect a market within the
United States and have been successful in causing that intended ef-
fect.10 Thus, the major change in the law effectuated by Judge
Hand's Alcoa decision was the shift in focus of the subject matter
3. Laker Airways Ltd. v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909 (D.C. Cir.
1984).
4. See e.g., Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America, 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir.
1976). See also infra note 18 and accompanying text.
5. 213 U.S. 347, 355 (1909).
6. Id. For a general history of extraterritorial application of United States antitrust
law, see generally 2 J. ATWOOD & K. BREWSTER, ANTITRUST AND AMERICAN BUSINESS
ABROAD 142051 (1981) [hereinafter cited as ATWOOD & BREWSTER]; B. HAWK, UNITED
STATES, COMMON MARKET AND INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST: A COMPARATIVE GUIDE 22-44
(1979) [hereinafter cited as HAWK].
7. 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945) (corporation which controlled ninety percent of a mar-
ket could not escape charges of monopoly on grounds that the monopoly had been thrust upon
it or that it assisted competition).
8. Id. at 443.
9. ATWOOD & BREWSTER, supra note 6, at 147-52.
10. 148 F.2d at 444.
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jurisdiction inquiry "from the location of the conduct to the location
of the effect."11
Notwithstanding the restrictions established under this effects
doctrine, as it became known, the Alcoa decision substantially ex-
tended the reach of American jurisdiction abroad.'" Consequently,
several courts 3 and commentators, both foreign"' and domestic,' 5
took the view that the assertion of jurisdiction based solely on eco-
nomic effects was improper. The British criticism of the application
of the effects test was particularly severe."
Partly due to this criticism some courts have within the past ten
years begun to reconsider the effects doctrine. 17 The first court to
criticize the doctrine was the Ninth Circuit in Timberlane Lumber
Co. v. Bank of America.'8 While not abandoning Alcoa altogether,
the Ninth Circuit criticized the effects test as "incomplete" because
it failed to consider other nations' interests.' 9 As an alternative, the
Timberlane court suggested that a court first assess whether an al-
leged antitrust violation had some effect on United States commerce.
If such an effect was found, then a balancing process would be ap-
plied to the case facts to determine whether "the interests of, and
links to, the United States - including the magnitude of the effect
on American foreign commerce - are sufficiently strong, vis-i-vis
1I. Note, The United States-Australian Cooperation Agreement: A Step in the Right
Direction, 24 VA. J. INT'L L. 127, 138 (1983) (footnote omitted) (citing Note, Defining Juris-
dictional Limits in International Antitrust: Should the EEC Adopt the Timberlane Ap-
proach?, 5 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 469, 479 (1982)) [hereinafter cited as Note, Australian Coop-
eration Agreement].
12. Indeed, regarding the reach of the effects doctrine elucidated in the Alcoa decision,
two commentators have asserted: "Any conduct, anywhere, by anybody which was intended to
restrain American import, export, or interstate trade or commerce in a manner unlawful by
domestic standards would be prima facie within reach, with the defendant then having the
burden of disproving an effect on that commerce." ATWOOD & BREWSTER, supra note 6, at
147-52.
13. See, e.g., Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287 (3rd Cir.
1979); Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America, 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976).
14. See Jennings, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction and the United States and Antitrust
Laws, 33 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 146 (1957); Stanford, The Application of the Sherman Act to
Conduct Outside the United States: A View from Abroad, II CORNELL INT'L L.J. 195, 210-11
(1978) [hereinafter cited as Stanford].
15. Haight, International Law and Extraterritorial Application of the Antitrust Laws,
63 YALE L.J. 639 (1954).
16. 973 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) 1533, 1535 (1979). See infra note 30 and accom-
panying text.
17. See, e.g., Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287 (3d Cir.
1979); Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America, 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976).
18. 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976). The basic allegation of the plaintiffs was that offi-
cials of the Bank of America and others located in the United States and Honduras conspired
to prevent Timberlane from milling lumber in Honduras and exporting it to the United States,
thus maintaining control of the Honduran lumber export business in the hands of a few select
individuals financed and controlled by the Bank. See generally, Recent Developments -
Timberlane Co. v. Bank of America, 4 BROOKLYN J. INT'L L. 97 (1977); Recent Ninth Circuit
Decisions - Application of the Sherman Act - A New Analysis - Timberlane Lumber Co.
v. Bank of America, 10 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 677 (1977).
19. 549 F.2d at 611-12.
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those of other nations, to justify an assertion of extraterritorial au-
thority. ' 20 The court listed several criteria which it recommended be
weighed to "determine whether . . . the contacts and interests of the
United States are sufficient to support the exercise of extraterritorial
jurisdiction."2 The Timberlane court thus established a "jurisdic-
tional rule of reason;''22 a "complex and multivariable comity analy-
sis ''23 that is intended to address other nations' concerns.
The Timberlane balancing approach has not been adopted by
many circuits. 24 The District of Columbia Circuit recently rejected
that approach, for example, in the Laker Airways litigation. 25 In ad-
dition to this lack of support within the United States, foreign gov-
ernments "continue to protest" that the Timberlane test is a viola-
tion of international law. 26
20. Id. at 613.
21. Id. at 614. The elements to be weighed include the degree of conflict with foreign
law or policy, the nationality or allegiance of the parties and the location or principal place of
business of corporations, the extent to which enforcement by either state can be expected to
achieve compliance, the relative significance of the effects on the Untied States as compared
with those elsewhere, the extent to which there is explicit purpose to harm or affect American
commerce, the foreseeability of such effect, and the relative importance of the violations
charged of conduct within the United States as compared with conduct abroad.
In Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287 (3d Cir. 1979), the court
adopted the Timberlane factors but also expanded them to include:
I. Degree of conflict with foreign law or policy;
2. Nationality of the parties;
3. Relative importance of the alleged violation of conduct here compared to that
abroad;
4. Availability of a remedy abroad and the pendency of litigation there;
5. Existence of intent to harm or affect American commerce and its
forseeability;
6. Possible effect upon foreign relations if the court exercises jurisdiction and
grants relief;
7. If relief is granted, whether a party will be placed in the position of being
forced to perform an act illegal in either country or be under conflicting require-
ments by both countries;
8. Whether the court can make its order effective;
9. Whether an order for relief would be acceptable in this country if made by
the foreign nation under similar circumstances;
10. Whether a treaty with the affected nations has addressed the issue.
595 F.2d 1287, 1297-98.
22. Id. Kingman Brewster first recommended this approach 25 years ago in his book,
ANTITRUST AND AMERICAN BUSINESS ABROAD 298 (1958).
23. ATWOOD & BREWSTER, supra note 6, at 163.
24. See, e.g., Laker Airways Ltd. v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909
(D.C. Cir. 1984); National Bank of Canada v. Interbank Card Ass'n, 666 F.2d 6 (2d Cir.
1981); In re Uranium Antitrust Litigation, 617 F.2d 1248 (7th Cir. 1980).
25. Laker Airways Ltd. v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909 (D.C. Cir.
1984); see infra notes 93-114 and accompanying text.
26. Note, Australian Cooperation Agreement, supra note 11, at 141 (commenting that
the protest continues because even under a Timberlane approach, economic effects still serve
as a basis of jurisdiction). Not only have a number of commentators rejected the Timberlane
analysis, but some courts have also refused to adopt a Timberlane standard. See, e.g., National
Bank of Canada v. Interbank Card Ass'n, 666 F.2d 6 (2d Cir. 1981) (plaintiff sought to enjoin
defendants from terminating their "mastercharge" credit card business but because such ter-
mination could not be foreseen to have any appreciable anticompetitive effects on United
States commerce, a violation of the Sherman Act would not be found); In re Uranium Anti-
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III. Sources of British Antipathy Toward American Antitrust
Laws
Unlike most areas of the law, the United Kingdom and the
United States have little shared legal tradition in the area of anti-
trust law.17 At the time of the Alcoa decision in 1945 no antitrust
legislation existed in Great Britain." In fact, it was only relatively
recently 9 that the United Kingdom began regulating business prac-
tices. The difference in government policy toward business that is
reflected in this divergent legislative treatment has for decades been
the basis for the friction between the United States and Great Brit-
ain regarding the extraterritorial application of American antitrust
laws by United States courts."
Although the differing philosophy regarding the control of busi-
ness is the basis for the friction that has arisen between the United
States and Great Britain, certain aspects of the extraterritorial appli-
cation of United States antitrust laws have particularly piqued Brit-
ish ire. The first concerns the unpredictability of the effects doctrine.
The British Secretary of State for Trade remarked in an address
before Parliament, "The wide extent and fundamental uncertainty of
this claimed reach of United States law through this pernicious ex-
traterritorial effects doctrine has created uncertainty for interna-
tional industry in this country and elsewhere."31
It is important to distinguish British concern regarding the ap-
plication as opposed to the substance of the effects doctrine.32 As one
British solicitor has remarked, "It is not so much the theoretical ba-
sis of jurisdiction which gives rise to difficulties but the application
of accepted principles to particular circumstances. '33 Indeed, Britain
trust Litigation, 617 F.2d 1248 (7th Cir. 1980). The district court in National Bank of Ca-
nada did apply the Timberlane analysis, but on appeal the circuit court stated that the "criti-
cal factor" in its decision was made under the effects test. National Bank of Canada, 666 F.2d
at 8. Although the National Bank of Canada court specifically remarked that it was not
"questioning the pertinence of Timberlane," id., its action amounted to a rejection of the bal-
ancing test.
27. Cira, The Challenge of Foreign Laws to Block American Antitrust Actions, 18
STAN. J. INT'L L. 247, 248 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Ciral.
28. Britain's first antitrust law was not passed until 1948, see Monopolies and Restric-
tive Practices (Inquiry & Control) Act, 1948, 11 & 12 Geo. 6, Ch. 66. Today, the antitrust
laws of the United Kingdom are centered upon the Restrictive Trade Practices Act 1976, c.
34. For a general discussion of this act, see Blythe, The Extraterritorial Impact of the Anti-
Trust Laws: Protecting British Trading Interests, 31 AM. J. COMP. L. 99, 100-02 (1983) [here-
inafter cited as Blythe].
29. See supra note 28.
30. Blythe, supra note 28, at 108-09.
31. 973 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) 1533, 1536 (1979) (Secretary of State for Trade
John Nott).
32. Griffin, Possible Resolutions of International Disputes Over Enforcement of U.S.
Antitrust Laws, 18 STAN. J. INT'L L. 279, 285 (1982); Note, Australian Cooperation Agree-
ment, supra note 11 at 167-68.
33. Silkin, The Perspective of the Attorney General of England and Whales, reprinted
in PERSPECTIVES ON THE EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF U.S. ANTITRUST AND OTHER
Fall 19851
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would be hypocritical in flatly asserting that it does not recognize the
extraterritorial application of competition laws based on an effects
test.34 As a member of the European Economic Community, Britain
agreed to be bound by Article 85 of the Treaty of Rome which uses
an effects test to assert extraterritorial jurisdiction. 5
The development of the Timberlane balancing process has not
assuaged British concern with the uncertainty of the application of
the effects doctrine. The reluctance of courts to accept the
Timberlane analysis has made Britain, and other nations as well,
"understandably hesitant to rely on Timberlane to restrain the al-
leged American tendency towards jurisdictional excess."' 6
Another source of British antipathy toward the extraterritorial
application of American antitrust law is that "rogue elephant"3 of
American antitrust: the availability of treble damages to private
plaintiffs in an antitrust action. The Americans view treble damages
as a deterrent to illegal activity in that they provide an incentive to
victims of antitrust violations to act as "private attorneys general."'3
The British, however, regard treble damages as penal in nature.89
The British government therefore claims that defendants sued by
private plaintiffs risk double jeopardy because they are exposed to
the possibility of being tried twice for the same offense - once in a
criminal case brought under the criminal provisions of the Sherman
Act and again under the "penal" treble damage provisions provided
parties in civil actions.40
A corollary to this concern regarding the treble damage provi-
sion is British criticism of the "unleashed prosecutorial discretion"
that the United States antitrust laws give private litigants. 41 The
LAWS 56 (J. Griffin ed. 1979).
34. Nonetheless, this assertion is still often made. See 973 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.)
1533, 1535.
35. Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Jan. 1, 1958, 298
U.N.T.S. 47. Since Jan. 1, 1973, Art, 85 has been directly applicable to the United Kingdom:
European Communities Act 1972 (c. 68), § 2(1).
For a discussion of Article 85 and its extraterritorial application see R. Folsom, CORPO-
RATE COMPETITION LAW IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES 72-73 (1978); HAWK, supra note 6,
at 455-59; Blythe, supra note 28, at 106-08.
36. Cira, supra note 27, at 267.
37. Griffin, The Incompatibility of International Accommodation and Private Attor-
neys General, 14 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 3 (1982).
38. United States Diplomatic Note concerning the U.K. Protection of Trading Interests
Act, 21 INT'L LEGAL MAT. 840, 843 (1982). See also Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S.
720, 745-46 (1977); Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 138-
39 (1968).
39. 973 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) 1533, 1536 (1979). See also Shipping Act of 1984,
supra note 1, at 209 n.80.
40. Note, Power to Reverse Foreign Judgments: The British Clawback Statute Under
International Law, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 1097, 1103-04 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Note,
Power to Reverse].
41. Note, A Comparative Analysis of the Efficacy of Bilateral Agreements in Resolv-
ing Disputes Between Sovereigns Arising From Extraterritorial Application of American An-
[Vol. 4:1
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British assert that private litigants in deciding whether or not to sue
do not take into account the same considerations that a public au-
thority would in an effort to enforce the antitrust laws.' The private
litigant sues only for private monetary gain and fails to make any
assessments, as would a public authority operating in the interest of
society and the community as a whole, regarding the impact of that
suit on the international community.' 3
A further source of British hostility stems from the liberal use
of discovery permitted under the American legal system." Under the
United States Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a litigant may re-
quest discovery of any information which is "reasonably calculated
to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence." 4 In addition, dis-
covery requests are not limited to parties in the suit and can be for
depositions as well as for documents.""
In Great Britain, however, the rules regarding the scope of dis-
covery are quite different. Indeed, the House of Lords recently char-
acterized the United States' liberal discovery rules as nothing short
of "fishing expeditions.' '  Under the English system discovery is
much more limited." It is restricted almost exclusively to the par-
ties. Information may not be gathered from a "mere witness."' 9
Moreover, unlike United States procedure, parties to the suit may
only discover non-privileged documents after the pleadings are final-
ized in detail.50 A British barrister would thus be expected to have
proof of most of the elements of his or her case prior to discovery. 1
A. Cases Which Have Intensified British Hostility
1. The North Atlantic Shipping Cases.-The North Atlantic
titrust Law: The Australian Agreement, 13 GA. J. INT'L & COMp. L. 49, 54 (1983) [hereinaf-
ter cited as Note, Comparative Analysis of the Australian Agreement]; Shipping Act of 1984,
supra note 1, at 290 n.80.
42. United Kingdom Response to U.S. Diplomatic Note Concerning the U.K. Protec-
tion of Trading Interests Bill, 21 INT'L LEGAL MAT. 847 (1979); see also 973 PARL. DEB.,
H.C. (5th ser.) 1533, 1549 (1979).
43. 973 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) 1533, 1549 (1979).
44. The United States is noted for the "liberality of its rules, the hunger of its lawyers,
and the passivity of its judiciary." ATWOOD & BREWSTER, supra note 6, at 227.
45. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1).
46. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a); see generally, Note, The British Protection of Trading Inter-
ests Act of 1980: An Analysis, 14 J. INT'L L. & EcON. 253, 260-61 (1980) [hereinafter cited
as Note, Protection of Trading Interests Act].
47. In re Westinghouse Elec. Corp. Uranium Contracts Litigation, [1978] 2 W.L.R.
81, 87 [1978], 1 All E.R. 434, 442 (H.L. 1977).
48. See Note, Procedural Aspects of Choice of Forum: A Comparative Look at En-
glish and American Discovery, 2 REv. OF LITIGATION, 119, 122 (1980) [hereinafter cited as
Note, Procedural Aspects of Choice of Forum].
49. Id. at 126-30.
50. Note, Protection of Trading Interests Act, supra note 46, at 261. See also Collins,
Opportunities for and Obstacles to Obtaining Evidence in England for use in Litigation in the
United States, 13 INT'L LAW. 27 (1978).
51. Note Procedural Aspects of Choice of Forum, supra note 48, at 120 n.12.
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Shipping cases 51 are examples of how American antitrust enforce-
ment engendered British resentment. The cases arose in June 1979
after a lengthy Justice Department investigation which resulted in
the indictment of seven corporations, two of which were British.58
The defendants were charged with conspiracy to "fix, raise, stabilize
and maintain price levels for the shipment of freight in the United
States/Europe trade" 4 without seeking or obtaining the approval of
the United States Federal Maritime Commission.
The matter ended with early pleas of nolo contendere by all de-
fendants and the court imposed total fines of $6.1 million, the largest
total fines ever assessed in one antitrust case.55 Subsequent to the
criminal action, more than thirty treble damage complaints were
filed which were then consolidated and certified as a class action and
were settled for approximately $51.4 million."0
The North Atlantic Shipping cases aroused British resentment
for two reasons. The first stemmed from the view that British com-
panies were perceived to be subject to double jeopardy because they
risked criminal judgments against them as well as an award of treble
damages in the civil suits. 57 The second reason was based on the
British (and European) philosophy that shipping in particular, be-
cause it is an international industry, should not be subject to intense
regulation by any one nation. As the British Secretary of State for
Trade explained, "The policy of the British Government, along with
that of all European governments, has been to avoid detailed regula-
tory intervention in the commercial aspects of international shipping.
We believe that to be the best way of achieving efficient and effective
shipping services and protecting the interests of the consumer."58
Britain therefore argued that the extraterritorial enforcement of
United States antitrust laws in the North Atlantic Shipping cases
infringed Great Britain's sovereignty.59
2. The Uranium Cases.-In Rio Tinto Zinc Corp. v. Westing-
52. United States v. North Atlantic Container Line, Ltd., No. 79-271 (D.D.C. filed
June I, 1979) (settled July II, 1979, see Cira, supra note 27, at 250); In re Ocean Shipping
Antitrust Litigation, 500 F. Supp. 1235 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), settled, 1982-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 1
64,585 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 19, 1982); In re Unfiled Agreements in the North Atlantic Trades, No.
79-83 (F.M.C. filed Aug. 14, 1979, discontinued, June, 1984) [these cases are hereinafter
cited as North Altantic Shipping cases].
53. See generally Note, Protection of Trading Interest Act, supra note 46, at 261-63.
54. Id. at 261.
55. Cira, supra note 27, at 251.
56. Id. at n.24 (citing Settlements of About $51.4 Million Approved in Ocean Shipping
Litigation, [Jan.-June] ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) No. 1052, at 370 (Feb. 18,
1982)).
57. See supra notes 39-40 and accompanying text.
58. 973 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) 1533, 1538 (1979).
59. Note, Protection of Trading Interests Act, supra note 46, at 262.
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house Electric Corp.,60 Westinghouse was seeking evidence to prove
the existence of a uranium cartel which had allegedly inflated the
market price of uranium. Westinghouse needed the information to
establish commercial impracticability in defense of breach of con-
tract actions brought against it. The House of Lords prevented en-
forcement of discovery demands served by the District Court of Vir-
ginia on various Rio Tinto Zinc (RTZ) executives pursuant to letters
rogatory. 61 The Law Lords agreed with District Court Judge
Mehrige who flew to London to rule on the dispute regarding the
discovery demands. Judge Mehrige found that the RTZ employees
had a valid fifth amendment privilege in refusing to answer questions
during the requested deposition. 2 In addition, the Law Lords also
found that the RTZ employees could not be required to produce the
documents because those documents could be used as evidence of a
violation of Article 85 of the Treaty of Rome.13
The uranium cases were "probably the event most responsible
for turning British official opinion against American antitrust en-
forcement. ' 64 RTZ had, in fact, joined a uranium cartel, but this
was in response to a ban by the United States on the importation of
uranium.65 Further British resentment was fueled when the Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit expressed anger in response to the
filing of an amicus brief by the British government presenting British
views on the American Westinghouse case. Court of Appeals Judge
Campbell is reported to have exclaimed, "Shockingly to us, the gov-
ernments of the defaulters have subserviently presented for them
their case against the exercise of jurisdiction. ' 6
IV. The Protection of Trading Interests Act
As a direct result of the strain placed on United States-British
trade relations by the North Atlantic Shipping cases and the ura-
nium case,67 the British Parliament signed the Protection of Trading
Interests Act (PTIA) into law on March 20, 1980.68 The PTIA not
60. [19781 2 W.L.R. 81, I AlI E.R. 434 (H.L. 1977). See generally, Kohlmeier, The
Uranium Affair, 13 J. INT'L L. & ECON. 149 (1979) (outlining a history of the problems giving
rise to the litigation).
61. [1978] 2 W.L.R. at 95, [1978] 1 All E.R. at 449. The letters rogatory sought the
deposition of nine RTZ executives and also contained requests for documents. [19781 2
W.L.R. at 84, [1978] 1 All E.R. at 440.
62. [1978] 2 W.L.R. at 90, [1978] 1 All E.R. at 445. For a first-hand account, see
Mehrige, The Westinghouse Uranium Case: Problems Encountered in Seeking Foreign Dis-
covery and Evidence, 13 INT'L LAW. 19 (1978).
63. [1978] 2 W.L.R. 103-05, [1978] 1 All E.R. 456-57.
64. Cira, supra note 27, at 250. See also Shipping Act of 1984, supra note 1, at 214.
65. Note, Protection of Trading Interests Act, supra note 46, at 264 n.68 (citing The
Private Ownership of Special Nuclear Materials Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2201 (v) (1976)).
66. In re Uranium Antitrust Litigation, 617 F.2d 1248, 1254-55 (7th Cir. 1980).
67. See supra text accompanying notes 52-66.
68. See supra note 2. See also generally Blythe, supra note 28; Danaher Anti-Anti-
Fall 1985]
48 DICKINSON JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 4:1
only stems from the hostility engendered by these two particular
cases, but it also exemplifies the long festering British resentment
toward the extraterritorial application of American antitrust laws in
general.6 9 The PTIA is therefore distinctly anti-American (and anti-
antitrust) despite contrary assertions by the British Secretary of
State for Trade.70
For a blocking statute, the PTIA is unprecedented in both
American71 and British experience.72 Previous blocking statutes were
defensive in nature, affecting only requests for discovery in the evi-
dence-gathering phase of a case.73 Under Sections 5 and 6 of the
PTIA, however, the British government adopted an offensive 4 stance
which, in addition to restricting pre-trial discovery, also prohibits the
post-trial enforcement of specific types of judgments. 75
This offensive character of the PTIA is found primarily in Sec-
tion 6, generally known as the "clawback" provision. 76 This section
allows citizens of the United Kingdom, or a body corporate of the
United Kingdom, or any person carrying on business in the United
trust Law: The Clawback and Other Feature of the United Kingdom Protection of Trading
Interests Act, 1980, 12 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 947 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Danaher];
Note, Power to Reverse, supra note 40; Note, The Protection of Trading Interests Act of 1980
- Britain's Latest Weapon in the Fight Against United States Antitrust Laws, 4 FORDHAM
INT'L L. F. 341 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Note, Britain's Latest Weapon]; Note, Protection
of Trading Interests Act, supra note 46; Comment, The Protection of Trading Interests Act of
1980: Britain's Response to U.S. Extraterritorial Antitrust Enforcement, 2 Nw. J. INT'L L. &
Bus. 476 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Comment, Britain's Response to U.S. Antitrust].
69. In a speech before the Parliament concerning the PTIA, Mr. Nott, the then British
Secretary of State for Trade, remarked, "The Bill is a response to a situation of a very particu-
lar nature which has been developing over several decades and which in the past few years has
become more acute." 973 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) 1533 (1979).
70. Mr. Nott claimed that "this bill is not anti-American or indeed anti-anybody," id.
at 1546. Nonetheless, the PTIA is "carefully tailored to counter American antitrust legisla-
tion." Note, Britain's Latest Weapon, supra note 68, at 372 n.151. See also, Lowe, Blocking
Extraterritorial Jurisdiction: The British Protection of Trading Interests Act, 1980, 75 AM. J.
INT'L L. 257 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Lowe].
71. United States Diplomatic Note Concerning the U.K. Protection Of Trading Inter-
ests Act, 21 INT'L LEGAL MAT. 840, 843 (1982).
72. See 973 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) 1533, 1542 (1979).
73. For example, Britain's earliest blocking statute, the Shipping Contracts and Com-
mercial Documents Act of 1964 was basically limited to denying foreign requests for evidence
to be used in cases arising under objectionable foreign shipping regulations. Shipping Con-
tracts and Commercial Documents Act of 1964, ch. 87. This Act was repealed by § 8 of the
PTIA. See also Comment, Britain's Response to U.S. Antitrust, supra note 68, at 509; Com-
ment, Foreign Blocking Legislation: Recent Roadblocks to Effective Enforcement of Ameri-
can Antitrust Law, 1981 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 945, 952 [hereinafter cited as Note, Foreign Blocking
Legislation]; Note, Shortening the Long Arm of American Antitrust Jurisdiction: Extraterri-
toriality and the Foreign Blocking Statutes, 28 Loy. L. REV. 213 (1982); Shipping Act of
1984, supra note 1, at 214 n.113.
74. To some, "offensive" may mean both "aggressive" and "repugnant." See WEBSTERS
THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1566 (3rd ed. 1966). As used in this article the
term means the opposite of "defensive."
75. PTIA, supra note 2, at c. !1, §§ 5,6. See also Comment, Britain's Response to
U.S. Antitrust, supra note 68, at 509.
76. Comment, Britain's Response to U.S. Antitrust, supra note 68, at 498. See also
Cira, supra note 27, at 249 ("The clawback is a retaliatory measure aimed primarily at Amer-
ican antitrust treble damage actions.").
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Kingdom to recover (clawback) the noncompensatory and punitive
treble damage portion of an antitrust award.17 Recovery is to be
made from any assets of the originally successful antitrust litigant
located within the jurisdiction of the United Kingdom.
Section 6 of the PTIA also acts to restrain the "unleashed
prosecutorial discretion" that the United States grants private liti-
gants to the distinct displeasure of the British government.7 8 By ena-
bling a defendant to recover the noncompensatory portion of an anti-
trust award, the PTIA very effectively weakens the treble damages
incentive provided by the Clayton Act to private attorneys general.7 9
Britain's aversion toward the liberal use of United States discov-
ery is also evident in Section 2 of the PTIA. Section 2 allows the
British Secretary of State the discretion to prohibit compliance with
a discovery request or an order to produce commercial information80
if it appears to him that the requirement is inadmissible. 1 Section 2
codifies the House of Lords' holding in Rio Tinto Zinc Corp. v.
Westinghouse Electric Corp.82 where the Law Lords disallowed the
release of information merely because it might lead to the discovery
77. PTIA, supra note 2, at c. 11, 6(1), 6(2). These sections do not apply to a defendant
who was ordinarily resident in the overseas country whose courts awarded the punitive dam-
ages nor does it apply if the punitive damages were awarded based on activities exclusively
carried on in the overseas country. Id. §§ 6(3), 6(4).
78. See supra text accompanying notes 41-43.
79. See United States Diplomatic Note Concerning the U.K. Protection of Trading
Interests Act, 21 INT'L LEGAL MAT. 840, 843-44 (1982). One commentator summarized this
inhibiting effect as follows:
The Act's real importance lies not in its actual implementation, but in British
defendants' power to invoke it. Most antitrust cases are settled. The Act's draft-
ers did not anticipate that a significant number of American antitrust judgments
would be clawed back; rather, they designed the Act primarily to encourage
'out-of-court settlements at realistic levels.' Even if the Act is never actually
used, in other words, its in terrorem effect alone should insulate all British de-
fendants from the full force of section 4 of the Clayton Act.
Note, Enjoining the Application of the British Protection of Trading Interests Act in Private
American Antitrust Litigation, 790 MICH. L. REV. 1574, 1577-78 (footnote omitted) (citing
Wall St. J., Nov. 2, 1979, at 26, col. 3).
80. The request or order may be from a court, tribunal or authority of an overseas
country. PTIA, supra note 2, at c.ll 2(l)(a).
81. An order or requirement is inadmissible:
(a) if it infringes the jurisdiction of the United Kingdom or is otherwise prejudi-
cial to the sovereignty of the United Kingdom; or (b) if compliance with the
requirement would be prejudicial to the security of the United Kingdom or to
the relations of the government of the United Kingdom with the government of
any other country.
Id. §§ 2(2)(a)-(b).
Subsection 3 specifies that an order or requirement is also inadmissible:
(a) if it is made otherwise than for the purpose of civil or criminal proceedings
which have been instituted in the overseas country; or
(b) if it requires a person to state what documents relevant to any such proceed-
ings are or have been in his possession, custody or power or to produce for the
purposes of any such proceedings any documents other than particular docu-
ments specified in the requirement.
Id. § 2(3)(a)-(b).
82. 11978] 2 W.L.R. 81, [19781 1 All E.R. 434 (H.L. 1977).
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of other information that would be relevant at trial.8 3 Section 2 also
accords with Britain's "mere witness" rule.84
It is important to note that the PTIA operates extraterritori-
ally.8 5 Under Section 6(5), "A court in the United Kingdom may
entertain proceedings on a claim under this section notwithstanding
that the person against whom the proceedings are brought is not
within the jurisdiction of the court." 86 This jurisdictional mandate
appears to abandon the fundamental jurisdictional principles previ-
ously espoused by British and international law.8" Indeed, "if liter-
ally and liberally applied, the PTIA could have results that are as
wanting in comity as various American actions have been said to
have had." 88
Another interesting facet of the PTIA is that although it has an
offensive nature, its language seems to be addressed only to protect-
ing British defendants. It is doubtful that Parliament was contem-
plating a scenario where the PTIA would be applied to block a Brit-
ish plaintiff from pursuing an American cause of action. In fact, the
Parliamentary debates concerning the PTIA are silent on this point.
Any doubts as to whether or not the PTIA applies to British plain-
tiffs who use another nation's antitrust laws for their own benefit
were put to rest when, in 1984, the British Secretary of State for
Trade imposed the PTIA on Laker Airways, a British plaintiff.8 9
V. An Analysis of the Laker Airways Litigation
The significance of the Laker Airways90 case lies in the fact
that it was the first United States antitrust proceeding against which
the British courts applied the PTIA.91 More importantly, however,
83. [19781 2 W.L.R. 607-10, 1 All E.R. 441-43. For a discussion of the holding see
Comment, Britain's Response to U.S. Antitrust, supra note 68, at 507-08.
84. See supra text accompanying note 44.
85. See generally, Blythe, supra note 28, at 126; Danaher, supra note 68, at 960; Note,
Protection of Trading Interests Act, supra note 68, at 279. Cf. Lowe, supra note 70, at 274-75
(asserting that the PTIA is only territorial and national in its jurisdictional reach).
86. PTIA, supra note 2, at c. 11 § 6(5).
87. For a discussion of these jurisdictional principles see generally Danaher, supra note
68, at 958-960.
88. Cira, supra note 27, at 249.
89. Laker Airways Ltd. v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909, 920 (D.C.
Cir. 1984).
90. Id. For a discussion of the case see Meesen, Antitrust Jurisdiction Under Custom-
ary International Law, 78 AM. J. INT'L L. 783, 786-89 [hereinafter cited as Meesen]; Was-
senbergh, US [sic] Jurisdiction and Bilateral Air Agreements, 9 AIR L. 170 (1984) [hereinaf-
ter cited as Wassenberghl (this author criticizes Judge Wilkey's Circuit Court opinion in the
Laker case as being too expansive, but many of the author's assumptions are based on the
erroneous premise that the United States and the United Kingdom share concurrent jurisdic-
tion). See infra note 101 and accompanying text.
91. Note, The Impact of the British Protection of Trading Interests Act on the United
States Antitrust Suit Brought by Laker Airways Against British Airways and British Caledo-




Laker stands as an example of the clash of two fundamentally incon-
sistent competition policies in the context of private litigation.
A. History
Laker Airways' accusations of antitrust violations culminated in
a "complex sequence of litigation and counterlitigation" in which the
antitrust violations asserted by Laker were vigorously attacked by
the foreign defendants (i.e., British Airways, British Caledonian Air-
ways, Lufthansa and Swissair). 2
The most recent bout in the American courts, Laker Airways
Ltd. v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines,93 touched off a jurisdictional
battle between the British and American courts that eventually in-
volved the British Secretary of State for Trade. Laker filed its anti-
trust claims in the District Court for the District of Columbia and
obtained a preliminary injunction restraining the defendants from
taking any action in a British court that would impair the District
Court's jurisdiction. Two foreign defendants in the Laker Airways
litigation, British Airways and British Caledonian, obtained an in-
junction from the Court of Appeal of the United Kingdom re-
straining Laker from litigating its antitrust claims against them in
the United States courts.9 " These two defendants then used this in-
junction to challenge the District Court's previously issued prelimi-
nary injunction. 5
Meanwhile, Laker appealed the injunction issued by the United
Kingdom Court of Appeal and on July 19, 1984 the House of Lords
unanimously held that Laker's complaint stated no cause of action in
an English court. 6 On these grounds, the Law Lords held it was not
92. Laker Airways Ltd. v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909, 916 (D.C.
Cir. 1984). Laker Airways Ltd. was founded in 1966 by Sir Freddie Laker. Laker Airways
initially offered charter services between the United Kingdom and the United States. In 1971
Laker branched out into a scheduled transatlantic air service and began to operate "Skytrain"
services between London and New York. At one point, Laker Airways was carrying one out of
every seven scheduled air passengers between the United States and England. Id. at 917. In
1981 Laker's financial condition began to fail and at the same time the pound sterling suffered
a devaluation. Since most of Laker's revenues were in pounds while most of its debts and
expenses were in dollars, Laker ran into repayment difficulties. Laker then sought to have its
payment obligations re-financed, but allegedly members of the International Air Transport
Association (IATA) conspired to pressure Laker's creditors into rejecting the refinancing
scheme. At the same time IATA members allegedly initiated a sequence of low predatory
prices. As a result of these alleged conspiracies, Laker was forced into bankruptcy. Id. at 916-
17. See also Note, Impact of the PTIA, supra note 91. at 181 n. 1.
93. 731 F.2d 909 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
94. Id. at 920.
95. Id. at 918.
96. The Law Lords noted that "because the predominant purpose of the acts of [the
defendants] that are complained of was the defense of their own business interests as providers
of scheduled airline services on routes on which Laker was seeking to attract customers from
them by operating its Skytrain policy any English cause of action, for conspiracy would be
ruled out under ...English (as well as Scots) law ...." [1984] 3 W.L.R. 413, at 420.
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unconscionable to allow Laker to proceed in the United States
courts. Laker was therefore permitted to pursue its appeal in the
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. That Court of
Appeals held that the District Court's injunction was proper and
that Laker was free to proceed against the foreign defendants. 7
While the English and American courts were deciding the in-
junction issue, the British Secretary of State for Trade issued orders
and general directions under the PTIA prohibiting persons who car-
ried on business in the United Kingdom, with the exception of
American air carriers, from complying with any orders issued in con-
nection with the United States antitrust actions against United
Kingdom airlines. 98 Although Laker applied for judicial review of
the British Secretary of State's order, the Law Lords affirmed the
Court of Appeal's refusal of judicial review. The order therefore re-
mained intact following the appeal. 99 The case was, however, settled
in July, 1985.100
B. Case Analysis - A Rejection of Timberlane
The opinion issued by the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit in the Laker case' 0 ' is a scholarly one. The opinion
provides an excellent analysis of the issues involved in a case in
which the diametrically opposed antitrust policies of the United
States and the United Kingdom collide "head-on." 102
Before it began discussing the jurisdictional facts contained in
the case, the Court of Appeals made it clear that it would apply the
Alcoa effects doctrine. 03 The court stated unequivocally that in its
opinion the effects test was entirely consistent with nationally and
internationally recognized limits on sovereign authority. 04 The court
then observed that aside from the "unprecedented foreign challenge"
to Laker's antitrust claims, there was nothing in the complaint or the
97. 731 F.2d at 955.
98. For a full text of the order, see British Airways Board v. Laker Airways Ltd.,
[1984] 3 W.L.R. 413, 430-31.
99. Id. at 431-32. For an analysis of the order, see Note, Impact of the PTIA, supra
note 91.
100. Wall St. J., July 15, 1985 at 10, col. 1.
101. 731 F.2d 909 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
102. Id. at 916. The court's conclusion that there was concurrent jurisdiction between
the United States and Britain has not been made improper by the House of Lords decision in
British Airways Board v. Laker Airways Ltd., [1984] 3 W.L.R. 413. In that decision Lord
Diplock noted that "there is a single forum only that is of competent jurisdiction to determine
the merits of the claim; and the single forum is [an American] court." Id. at 420. Since the
issue of jurisdiction was mooted by this House of Lords decision, this article will not deal in
detail with the various injunctions issued by the American and British courts each in an effort
to wrest jurisdiction from the other. Instead, the article will analyze the Circuit Court's rejec-
tion of the Timberlane balancing approach. For a detailed description of the balancing ap-
proach itself, see supra notes 17-23 and accompanying text.




circumstances of the suit which suggested jurisdiction should not be
exercised under the effects test.105
.Having dealt with the issue of the applicability of the effects
doctrine, the court turned to the Timberlane balancing test. The
Timberlane approach, the court declared, was unworkable under the
facts of the Laker case.10 6 In addition, the court believed there were
unacceptable defects in the balancing process. For example, many of
the factors set forth in Timberlane were already taken into consider-
ation by courts in determining whether or not there was a sufficient
basis for jurisdiction.10 7 Other factors listed in the Timberlane opin-
ion were rejected as being "essentially neutral in deciding between
competing assertions of jurisdiction.10 8
The Circuit Court's primary complaint with the Timberlane
balancing process, however, concerned the inadequacy of any court
to deal with essentially political factors. Throwing upon the courts
the responsibility of determining the desirability and importance of
regulating restrictive business practices was particularly troubling to
the Laker court. In reference to the degree to which the desirability
of regulation is generally accepted, the court stated that "[an En-
glish or American court cannot refuse to enforce a law its political
branches have already determined is desirable and necessary."' 10 9
But regarding the importance a regulating state may place in the
regulation of business practices, the court simply noted, "We are in
no position to adjudicate the relative importance of antitrust regula-
tion or nonregulation to the United States and the United King-
dom."" 0 The court felt that the Timberlane process required a court
to make these political determinations. This, the court said, was not
within the competence of the judicial branch.
The Circuit Court in its Laker opinion added that it might be
willing to accept the Timberlane balancing test if it could be assured
that such a test would strengthen the bonds of international com-
ity."' It did not believe, however, that the Timberlane analysis could
guarantee increased comity." 2
In its final analysis the Circuit Court also observed that due to
obvious and unavoidable domestic biases, any court applying the
105. Id. at 946.
106. The court observed that "[T]his approach is unsuitable when courts are forced to
choose between a domestic law which is designed to protect domestic interests, and a foreign
law which is calculated to thwart the implementation of the domestic law in order to protect
foreign interests allegedly threatened by the objectives of the domestic law." Id. at 948.
107. d. For a list of the factors see supra note 21.
108. 731 F.2d at 949.
109. Id. (Emphasis deleted).
110. Id.
Ill. Id. at 950.
112. Id.
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Timberlane decision would find it inherently difficult to balance
United States interests against competing foreign interests.13 The
court remarked candidly that "[w]hen there is any doubt [as to
whether or not to assert jurisdiction], national interests will tend to
be favored over foreign interests. This partially explains why there
have been few times when courts have found foreign interests to
prevail.1 '1 4
For the reasons set forth above, the Circuit Court in the Laker
case did not feel the Timberlane balancing process was a valid
method under which to determine jurisdiction. And in any event,
both judicial and scholarly criticism of Timberlane had so intensified
by the time the Circuit Court rendered its Laker opinion, the court
did not feel bound to follow the Timberlane decision. 1 5
VI. Was the Laker Court's Rejection of Timberlane Proper?
The court's rejection of Timberlane was proper in that it recog-
nized and accepted as valid the growing dissatisfaction with the bal-
ancing approach. The rejection also, however, signaled the need for
the development of another solution to the problem of extraterrito-
rial application of United States antitrust laws.
The court's strongest criticism of Timberlane was that it re-
quired the judicial system to balance what were essentially political
factors." 6 In forming this opinion the court relied on a growing do-
mestic wave of criticism that pointed out that courts were ill-
equipped and found it inherently difficult to neutrally balance com-
peting international interests. As one noted scholar succintly stated:
The development of processes to resolve conflicting claims
of authority to forbid or require conduct within a nation's bor-
ders is most appropriately carried out by diplomatic exchange,
not by judicial decisions in which a forum balances its own in-
terests against the competing interests of other states."17
International criticism has also been levied against
Timberlane." 8 Interestingly enough, the British government is one
113. Id. at 951.
114. Id.
115. Id. In addition to the articles cited in the opinion, see Bork, Introduction [To Sym-
posium on International Antitrust], 18 STAN. J. INT'L L. 243, 245 (1982); Feinberg, Economic
Coercion and Economic Sanctions: The Expansion of United States Extraterritorial Jurisdic-
tion, 30 AM. U. L. REv. 323, 331 (1981).
116. See supra notes 109-110 and accompanying text.
117. Maier, Interest Balancing and Extraterritorial Jurisdiction, 31 AM. J. CoMP. L.
579, 581 (1983). Professor Maier then went on to note several cases which purported to use a
Timberlane balancing test but either gave foreign national interests short shrift or ignored
them completely. Id. at 590-93.
Professor Maier's criticism of the Timberlane approach was relied upon by the Circuit
Court in its Laker decision. 731 F.2d at 937.
118. See, e.g., Meesan, supra note 90, at 801-02; Wassenbergh, supra note 90, at 178 n.
[Vol. 4:1
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of these international critics. In a diplomatic note regarding the
PTIA the United Kingdom remarked that although Timberlane may
"limit the circumstances in which the [antitrust] remedy may be
available, these tests remain within these wider claims to jurisdiction
to which Her Majesty's Government object. 11 9
This international criticism, together with assertions of dissatis-
faction domestically and the pointed rejection of the Timberlane
analysis by United States courts,120 indicate that the solution created
by the Timberlane court has failed in its effort to resolve the
problems stemming from excessive extraterritorial application of
American antitrust laws. The problem is inherently too political for
a judicial resolution to be possible.
VII. The Need for a Bilateral Antitrust Treaty
The Laker opinion drives home an important point: "Maintain-
ing international competition is the proper business of diplomats and
negotiation, not federal judges and litigation.' ' 2 1 Judge Wilkey, who
wrote the District Court opinion in the Laker case, attempted to vent
his frustration in failing to adequately balance the political interests
in the case by writing:
[T]his court has neither the authority nor the institutional
resources to weigh the policy and political factors that must be
evaluated when resolving competing claims of jurisdiction. In
contrast, diplomatic and executive channels are, by definition,
designed to exchange, negotiate, and reconcile the problems
which accompany the realization of national interests within the
sphere of international association. 2 '
Current approaches to extraterritorial application of antitrust
law are inadequate guides as to when jurisdiction may be asserted.
This article has already discussed how the Timberlane approach is
inadequate.123 Other proposed solutions have been as inadequate as
the Timberlane-type court-attempted solutions. The Foreign Trade
Antitrust Improvement Act of 1982,124 for example, accomplished
little. The main purpose of the Act was simply to clarify, not change,
20; Note, The Australia-United States Agreement on Co-operation in Antitrust Matters, 33
INT'L & COMp. L.Q. 230, 231-32 (1984).
119. United Kingdom Response to U.S. Diplomatic Note, 21 INT'L LEGAL MAT. 847,
850 (1979).
120. See supra notes 24-25 and accompanying text.
121. Hammarskjold, About the Need to Bridge a Jurisdictional Chasm, 8 ANNALS AIR
& SPACE L. 97 (1983) (quoting a Washington Post editorial of November 4, 1979).
122. Laker Airways Ltd. v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909, 955 (D.C.
Cir. 1984).
123. See supra text accompanying notes 106-20.
124. The Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act of 1982, 96 Stat. 1246, 15 U.S.C.
§ 6a 45(a)(3) (1982).
Fall 19851
56 DICKINSON JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
the prevailing judicial standard for determining the jurisdictional
reach of American antitrust laws.125 It was for this reason that the
former Assistant Attorney General for Antitrust warned that it was
"important not to expect too much from the Act." '126
Proposed Section 403 of the Restatement (Second) of the For-
eign Relations Law also does little to clarify this troubled area of the
law.1 1 7 The Restatement proposes a test of "reasonableness." This
test comes perilously close to the Timberlane test and its inherent
defects. As would occur under a strict application of Timberlane, a
court using the factors listed in the Restatement would "often find
the factors favoring United States policy of greatest importance." 12 8
The Restatement thus does not provide any guarantee against the
domestic biases of a United States court.
Likewise, the Bermuda bilateral agreement relating to air ser-
vices between Britain and the United States (Bermuda 2)129 is not
an adequate solution to the antitrust conflict. Indeed, Nicholas Rid-
ley, the British Secretary of State for Transport, recently asserted
that Bermuda 2 is "virtually unworkable" because of the way it can
be overridden by United States antitrust laws.130
Great Britain's PTIA adds another dimension to the problems
which must be resolved or mitigated by treaty. The inflexibility of
the PTIA exacerbates the friction between the admittedly opposite
regulatory philosophies of the United States and Great Britain.'
The solution to the current problem between the United States
and the United Kingdom concerning the extraterritorial application
of American antitrust laws is clearly a treaty:
In today's integrated world economy, the American interest
in protecting its free-market system increasingly conflicts with
the interests of foreign governments that deplore such 'legal im-
perialism' . . . Bilateral or international treaties such as the one
recently concluded between the United States and Australia, are
125. Shenefield, Thoughts on Extraterritorial Application of the U.S. Antitrust Laws,
52 FORDHAM L. REV. 350, 367 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Shenefield].
126. Id. at 366.
127. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 403(2) (Tent. Draft No. 2) (1981).
128. Wallace, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction, 15 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. J. 1099, 1106
(1983). See supra text accompanying note 113.
129. Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Gov-
ernment of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and North Ireland Concerning Air Services,
July 23, 1977, 28 U.S.T. 5367, T.I.A.S. No. 8641.
130. AVIATION WEEK & SPACE TECH. 26 (November 5, 1984).
131. See supra notes 68-89 and accompanying text. Ironically, the fact that the PTIA is
so caustic and its effects so harsh may alleviate the extraterritorial application of American
antitrust law problems by providing an exceptionally strong incentive to both the United King-
dom and the United States to negotiate a mutually agreeable antitrust enforcement policy. 405
PARL. DEB. H.L. (5th ser.) 1518 (1980).
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preferable to judicial attempts to resolve these controversies.'
VIII. Proposed Treaty Provisions
The Australia-United States Agreement on Cooperation in An-
titrust Matters (Australian Agreement) 3' and the Canada-United
States Memorandum of Understanding with Respect to the Applica-
tion of National Antitrust Laws (Canadian Memorandum)134 clearly
illustrate that the problems caused by the extraterritorial application
of American antitrust laws can be resolved through international ne-
gotiations and intergovernmental agreements. The conflicts which
led to the agreements between the United States, Australia, and Ca-
nada are substantially similar to those that are a current source of
disharmony between the United States and Great Britain.1 35 Thus
the Australian Agreement and Canadian Memorandum provide the
groundwork upon which to model a United States-United Kingdom
antitrust treaty. Based on the Australian Agreement and the Cana-
dian Memorandum, the remaining part of this article will recom-
mend provisions that should be included in such a treaty.
A. Intergovernment Notification of Antitrust Law Implications
Article 1 of the Australian Agreement requires that the United
States and Australia notify one another of government policies that
may have antitrust implications for either country.'36 Section 2 of
that same Article requires that the Department of Justice or the
132. Note, The Inconvenient Forum and International Comity in Private Antitrust Ac-
tions, 52 FORDHAM L. REV. 399, 400 (1983).
133. Agreement on Antitrust Cooperation, United States-Australia, June 29, 1982,
U.S.T. __ , T.I.A.S. No. 10365, reprinted in 21 INT'L LEGAL MAT. 702 (1982) [hereinafter
cited as Australian Agreement]. See also Note, A Comparative Analysis of the Australian
Agreement, supra note 41; Note, Australian Cooperation Agreement, supra note 11.
134. Memorandum of Understanding Between the Government of the United States of
America and the Government of Canada as to Notification, Consultation and Cooperation
with Respect to the Application of National Antitrust Laws, - U.S.T. -_, T.I.A.S. No.
- reprinted in 23 INT'L LEGAL MAT. 275 (1984) [hereinafter cited as Canadian
Memorandum].
135. Baker, Antitrust Conflicts between Friends: Canada and the United States in the
Mid-1970's, I1 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 165 (1978). All three nations were affected by the West-
inghouse/Uranium litigation. See Note, Comparative Analysis of the Australian Agreement,
supra note 41, at 62-63; Note, Australian Cooperation Agreement, supra note 11, at 142-51.
Moreover, Canada and Australia enacted blocking statutes soon after the Uranium litigation.
See Note, Foreign Blocking Legislation, supra note 73, at 971 n.200. Dissatisfaction with
broad discovery requests by U.S. litigants, id. at 974, and resentment towards treble damages,
Note, Australian Cooperation Agreement, supra note 11, at 142, were factors which prompted
Australia and Canada, like Britain, to enact blocking legislation.
For a general perspective of the Australian view of United States antitrust law, see gener-
ally, Pengilley, Extraterritorial Effects of United States Commercial and Antitrust Legisla-
tion: A View from Down Under, 16 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 833 (1983). For a Canadian
perspective, see Gotlieb, Extraterritoriality: A Canadian Perspective, 5 Nw. J. INT'L L. &
Bus. 449 (1983); Stanford, supra note 14.
136. Australian Agreement, supra note 133, art. I.
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Federal Trade Commission notify the government of Australia of
any United States government obligation arising under United
States statutes or regulations that may impact upon Australian laws,
policies, or national interests.'
The Canadian Memorandum goes beyond the Australian
Agreement by detailing situations in which notification is re-
quired. 138 Also unlike the Australian Agreement, which only allows
such notification be transmitted along regular diplomatic chan-
nels,139 the Canadian Memorandum provides for prompt notification
where time is of the essence. 140
A notification provision is essential to a treaty or agreement be-
tween the United States and the United Kingdom because it outlines
the method of communication to be used between the two countries.
The more detailed and efficient the method, the greater the assur-
ance that potential antitrust violations will be detected and pre-
vented before a company from either country commits itself to con-
duct that is contrary to the antitrust laws."" For this reason the
more extensive Canadian Memorandum would provide the better
model for any notification provision included in an antitrust agree-
ment entered into between the United States and Great Britain.
B. Consultation Provision
Likewise, a consultation procedure similar to that contained in
Article 2 of the Australian Agreement 42 and Section 4 of the Cana-
137. Id. at art. 1(2).
138. According to the Canadian Memorandum,
Situations requiring notification will include those in which:
(i) An antitrust investigation is likely to inquire into the activity carried
out wholly or in part in the territory of the other party;
(ii) An antitrust investigation is likely to inquire into any activity carried
out wholly or in part outside the territory of the investigating Party, and
there is no reason to believe that the activity is required, encouraged or
approved by the other Party;
(iii) It is expected that information to be sought is located in the territory
of the other Party;
(iv) Information is sought to be gathered by the personal visit of antitrust
officials to the territory of the other Party;
(v) An investigation, whether or not previously notified, may reasonably
be expected to lead to a prosecution or other enforcement action likely to
affect a national interest of the other Party.
Canadian Memorandum, supra note 134, at § 2(3).
139. Australian Agreement, supra note 133, at art. 1(5).
140. Section 2(4) provides that "Where time is of the essence, initial notification may be
provided by telephone communication between the Parties' antitrust authorities, with confir-
mation made promptly thereafter in writing by the above stated channels." Canadian Memo-
randum, supra note 134, at § 2(4).
141. Note, Australian Cooperation Agreement, supra note 11, at 155.
142. Article 2 states:
When it appears to the Government of the United States through notifica-
tion . . . that a policy of the Government of Australia may have significant anti-
trust implications under United States law, the Government of the United States
[Vol. 4:1
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dian Memorandum 1 43  should be incorporated into the proposed
treaty. Such a provision would allow either the United States or the
United Kingdom to communicate their respective interests directly
to the opposite government without being forced to resort to the use
of diplomatic notes. 4 As a result, each government would be able to
consider one another's interests before enacting antitrust legislation.
C. Required Consideration of the Opposing Nation's Interests
It would be beneficial to both parties if the United States-
United Kingdom treaty codified the need for each nation to seriously
consider the opposing nation's interests during any period of consul-
tation. Paragraph 5 of Article 2 of the Australian Agreement is an
example of this type of provision:
Both parties during consultations shall seek earnestly to
avoid a possible conflict between their respective laws, policies
and national interests and for that purpose to give due regard to
each other's sovereignty and to considerations of comity. 45
A paragraph detailing this requirement would not only give each
party impetus for considering the other's point of view, it would pro-
vide a basis for demanding that one's own point of view be taken into
consideration.
D. Notification Prior to Thwarting Discovery Requests
Section 5 of the Canadian Memorandum requires notification
and consultation before a party institutes a defensive measure for the
shall communicate its concern and may request consultations with the Govern-
ment of Australia. The Government of Australia shall participate in such
consultations.
Australian Agreement, supra note 133, at art. 2.
143. Section 4 states in relevant part:
Either party may request consultation when it believes that an antitrust in-
vestigation, proceeding, . . . or action relating to an antitrust investigation or
proceeding, is likely to affect its significant national interests or require the seek-
ing of information from its territory.
Canadian Memorandum, supra note 134, at § 4.
144. A diplomatic note was the only means whereby the United States could express its
concern over the PTIA to the United Kingdom Government. See United States Diplomatic
Note Concerning the U.K. Protection of Trading Interests Act, 21 INT'L LEGAL MAT. 840
(1982).
145. Australian Agreement, supra note 133, at art. 2(5). The Canadian Memorandum
states a similar purpose of conflict avoidance:
This Memorandum of Understanding outlines arrangements for notification
and consultation between the Parties with respect to the application of their re-
spective antitrust laws, with the purpose of avoiding or moderating conflicts of
interest and policies. The Understanding also establishes procedures for coopera-
tion in order to enhance the substantial benefits which both derive from mutual
assistance in the enforcement of the antitrust laws.
Canadian Memorandum, supra note 134, at § 1.
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purpose of thwarting a discovery request. 46 If this provision were
incorporated into the United States-United Kingdom treaty it would
deter the British Secretary of State from issuing blocking orders on
discovery as was done in the Laker case. 47
E. Opinion Letters from the Department of Justice
Article 4 of the Australian Agreement provides a "unique pro-
cess" whereby an Australian business can demand an opinion from
the Department of Justice as to whether its proposed conduct is law-
ful.' "48 Under the Agreement, the Justice Department's opinion is ad-
visory only and is not binding on the Department. Such a provision
would, from the point of view of British businesses, lend a degree of
certainty to the application of the antitrust laws.149
F. Limitations on United States Discovery Procedures
In order to protect British interests, the United States-United
Kingdom treaty should contain a provision requiring American
courts to postpone discovery abroad until it is clear that evidence
from domestic sources is inadequate. 50 Since the American system
of pleading is so fundamentally different from the British system, not
allowing American (or British) litigants to discover information from
"mere witnesses" would be unworkable.' 5 ' Nonetheless, these pro-
posals might deter plaintiffs who use American antitrust laws from
engaging in "fishing expeditions" in Great Britain. 52
G. Government Participation in Antitrust Suits
Two novel provisions, Article 6 of the Australian Agreement
and Section 11 of the Canadian Memorandum, authorize Australia
and Canada to demand that the United States government partici-
pate in private antitrust suits. 153 Both agreements obligate the
United States to report to the court on the outcome of consultations
between the respective governments. 54 The Canadian Memorandum
146. Id. § 5.
147. See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
148. Note, Australian Cooperation Agreement, supra note 11, at 157; Australian
Agreement, supra note 133, at art. 4.
149. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
150. Shenefield, supra note 125, at 371.
151. One commentator has noted that "English and American discovery are fundamen-
tally and philosophically different, and . . . there is little hope of the English adopting Ameri-
can-style discovery or vice versa." Note, Procedural Aspects of Choice of Forum, supra note
48, at 130.
152. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
153. Australian Agreement, supra note 133, at art. 6; Canadian Memorandum, supra
note 134, at § 11.
154. Australian Agreement, supra note 133, at art. 6; Canadian Memorandum, supra
note 134, at § 11.
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also provides for participation by the United States government in
private antitrust suits that have not been the subject of consultations,
but this provision is unfortunately discretionary. 155
A governmental participation provision would alleviate British
concern over the motives of private attorneys generall56 and there-
fore should be included in an antitrust agreement entered into by the
United States and Great Britain. However, the requirement that the
United States government participate in a private lawsuit at the re-
quest of the United Kingdom should be made mandatory on the
American government. To avoid any abuse of this provision, the
United Kingdom should not only have the duty to act in good faith,
it should also be responsible to sift through the requests of those
private litigants who request United States government intervention
to be sure that those requests are reasonable. If notwithstanding
British government review of these requests it appears to the United
States that a request is frivolous, there should be intergovernmental
consultations to determine the validity of each request.
The governmental participation provision should also require
that the United States government give the court a "detailed" re-
port. Such detailed report would allow for the application of a
Timberlane analysis to a case because the political factors would
have already been weighed by the political branch of the government
prior to the court's attempt to determine jurisdiction. 157 As a result,
the courts would be assisted in making the determination of whether
or not to assert jurisdiction. Neither the Australian Agreement nor
the Canadian Memorandum presently set forth any requirements as
to the type or specificity of the report the United States government
must submit to the court.'58
H. United States Government Recommendations Regarding Impo-
sition of Treble Damages
In its report to the court in a private antitrust suit, the United
States government should include a recommendation regarding
whether or not the treble damages should be imposed. The trial
155. The Canadian Memorandum states:
When the conduct dealt with in a private antitrust suit has not been the
subject of notification and consultation under this Understanding, the Party in
whose court the suit is pending may, at the request of the other Party or on its
own initiative, inform the court of how the national interest of the other Party
may be implicated by the court or may offer to the court such other facts or
views as it considers appropriate in the circumstance.
Canadian Memorandum, supra note 134, at § 11(2) (emphasis added).
156. See supra text accompanying notes 41-43.
157. A detailed report would certainly assuage Judge Wilkey's concern over engaging in
the balancing of political factors as expressed in the Circuit Court opinion in the Laker Case,
731 F.2d 909 (D.C. Cir. 1984). See supra notes 108-09 and accompanying text.
158. Note, Australian Cooperation Agreement, supra note 11, at 156.
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court would then have the discretion to award or not award such
damages as it sees fit. (Under current law the award of treble dam-
ages is mandatory. 159)
Although this may be the most controversial recommendation
made in this article (nothing resembling this type of provision is in-
cluded in either the Australian Agreement or the Canadian Memo-
randum), the idea is not as radical as would first be supposed. Re-
quiring government recommendations on the imposition of treble
damages was proposed by the former Assistant Attorney General for
antitrust, Mr. John Shenefield. 6 o In addition, Professors Areeda and
Turner, authors of the hornbook Antitrust Law, also suggested that
the decision to award treble damages should be left to the discretion
of the trial court.' The same concept was supported by Paul Mc-
Grath, the former Justice Department's Chief Antitrust Enforcer, in
a recent interview. 62 He viewed the automatic tripling of antitrust
judgments as often harmful and indicated that he personally would
favor trimming the recovery in many private antitrust cases to actual
damages..63
Two arguments are generally made against this proposed modi-
fication of the antitrust laws to make the treble damage award dis-
cretionary. First, a discretionary award would dissipate the incentive
for private parties to bring antitrust lawsuits because they would not
be guaranteed the treble damage award.6 4 While this complaint
may have some merit if viewed solely from the domestic sphere, it
159. See Clayton Act, § 4, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976).
160. The best possible way to moderate the treble damage feature with respect to for-
eign defendants in appropriate cases, however, would be to give the Attorney General or the
trial court discretion to limit recoveries to single damages. The Attorney General would be
preferable on the one hand because he has access to the best possible information on the likely
impact of the litigation on foreign relations, whereas a court would be required to get its
information less directly. The court, however, would be immune from the kind of pressure
litigants, including foreign governments, would attempt to exert. It might be best, therefore, to
allow the Attorney General to make a recommendation to limit damages in the appropriate
case while retaining discretion in the trial court to make the final determination. Shenefield,
supra note 125, at 372.
161. After discussing the negative consequences of treble damages, Areeda and Turner
remarked:
[AI1I of these difficulties could be ameliorated if trebling were discretionary
rather than mandatory. Judges occasionally lament the apparent absence of such
discretion. The language of the Clayton Act § 4 seems to have little room for
judicial discretion. But it is by no means clear that unqualified statutory lan-
guage cannot be interpreted to contain implied qualifications (1) in infrequent
situations not within the contemplation of those who wrote the statute and (2)
where qualification would best serve both the fundamental purposes of the stat-
ute and the ends of justice.
2 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW 331(b) (1978) (footnotes omitted).
162. Wall St. J., Nov. 16, 1984 at 18, col. 1.
163. Mr. McGrath criticized automatic tripling not only because it "inhibits a great
deal of procompetitive conduct" but also because it causes friction with U.S. trading partners
abroad. Id.
164. Note, The Antitrust Treble Damages Remedy, 9 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 435, 454
(1984) [hereinafter cited as Note, The Antitrust Treble Damage Remedy].
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makes little sense when a defendant is a British national or other
defendant who qualifies for protection under the PTIA. As previ-
ously noted, the PTIA has an in terrorem effect.' 5 Making the
award discretionary would therefore have no effect on a plaintiff's
incentive to bring a suit where a defendant qualifies for protection
under the PTIA, especially under the clawback provision.
The second argument against a discretionary award is that it
forces the trial court to balance the values of both nations as well as
the parties involved in addition to the facts and circumstances in-
volved in the case. This, the objectors say, would make fashioning an
equitable remedy in the form of an award of treble damages, or re-
fusal to award such damages, an extremely difficult task.16 6 This
complaint would not be valid if the provision requiring the United
States government to make a recommendation to the court regarding
the award of treble damages were adopted into the United States-
United Kingdom antitrust agreement. The government's recommen-
dation would assist the judge in making his or her final determina-
tion and thus lighten the court's burden.
An additional advantage to making the award of treble dam-
ages discretionary with the court is that there would be no need to
decriminalize the antitrust laws to placate British concerns regarding
double jeopardy. It is the automatic tripling of damages to which the
British object.1 67 The proposed provision, with its discretionary as-
pect, would essentially invalidate this British complaint.
IX. Conclusion
A bilateral antitrust treaty would be a positive step in ending
the antitrust cold war"6 8 that exists between the United States and
the United Kingdom. Otherwise, by continuing to place the burden
of resolving the antitrust dispute with the judiciary, the United
States and the United Kingdom will continue to suffer from an inter-
necine relationship in the area of antitrust law.
The Laker case illustrates the judiciary's inability to adequately
handle the conflicts caused by the extraterritorial application of
United States antitrust laws. The balancing of domestic and foreign
interests in order to determine if extraterriorial jurisdiction is proper
cannot be accomplished by the courts alone. The balancing must first
be performed by the political branch of the government and guide-
165. See supra note 79. For a discussion of the clawback provision see supra text ac-
companying notes 76-79.
166. Note, The Antitrust Treble Damage Remedy, supra note 164, at 454.
167. See supra notes 39-40 and accompanying text.
168. John Shenefield used this term to describe the antitrust conflict existing among
industrialized nations. Shenefield, Extraterritoriality in Antitrust, 15 LAW & POL'Y INT'L
Bus. 1109, 1113 (1983).
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lines must be established by that branch to aid the courts in making
case by case determinations.
In addition to the inability of American courts to deal with
these essentially political questions, Britain's frustration over the
lack of a political solution has resulted in the enactment of British
laws which have the potential of thwarting a proper reach of United
States antitrust jurisdiction. To protect its citizens and its policy in-
terests the United States must respond to this British legislation by
proposing and entering into serious negotiations with the British gov-
ernment regarding the adoption of a United States-United Kingdom
antitrust treaty.
